Saturday, March 13, 2021

Refuting Douglas Dietrich: "USS Indianapolis Was Sunk by Secret Japanese Occult Weapons"

Douglas Dietrich first makes this claim publicly during a guest appearance on Coast to Coast AM, May 30, 2011." The Sinking of USS Indianapolis" [1]


The Indianapolis was one of two Portland-class cruisers built during the early 1930s. It was formally commissioned in 1932. Before the war, it transported President Roosevelt on various occasions, including on a tour of South America. It was stationed with the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in the lead-up to the war. 

During the attack on December 7, 1941Indianapolis avoided damage because it was out on a training mission. The ship saw action in New Guinea, the Aleutian Islands, and the Battle of the Philippine Sea. It served along the way as the flagship for Admiral Raymond Spruance, Commander of the Fifth Fleet.

The Indianapolis was struck by a kamikaze attack during the Battle of Okinawa. The impact of the plane itself did little damage, but the pilot managed to drop a bomb that punched a hole in the ship's keel and led to several casualties. After emergency repairs, the ship went back to California for a full overhaul. While there, Indianapolis was chosen for a secret mission: to transport components of the Little Boy uranium bomb to Tinian. https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/uss-indianapolis

"Had it not been for the severe damage, the USS Indianapolis would not have been at Mare Island in July 1945. Had it not been for USS Pensacola’s engineering casualty, which prevented her from carrying the atomic bomb components to Tinian as planned, the USS Indianapolis would have still been at Mare Island when the war ended, and everyone would have survived, except those lost in the [previous] kamikaze attack. 

Instead, the USS Indianapolis came out of the repair yard early and still made the fastest transit to Pearl Harbor ever recorded and then to Tinian Island, playing a pivotal role in the execution of perhaps the most momentous decision ever made by a US President". https://www.ussindianapolis.com/the-story


USS Indianapolis 10 July 1945 Mare Island, CA.




Dietrich claims that the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) Submarine I-58 attacked and sunk the USS Indianapolis using several "Kaiten," suicide submarines, which roughly translated into English is “heaven-shaker.”

Kaiten Type 1


Dietrich told host George Noory:

"This has been brought up in several Naval Studies and it is the subject of enormous controversy...I can tell you for a fact that it did happen"

"Because of the nature of the weapon, the US Navy did not want to bring this up at his [McVay] trial. They did not want to bring up any of the intelligence information available from Ultra at his trial. Hashimoto tried to inform the Jury at his [McVay] Court Martial that there was nothing he could have done. They misinterpreted whatever he said in Japanese into English and said he had launched conventional torpedoes."

"One reason the US Military did not want to bring up suicide torpedoes is it was considered an occult weapon. The Japanese concept of occult warfare or the "black curtain" of harnessing occult forces." - Douglas Dietrich



IJN Submarine I-58


I-58 in 1945 showing Kaiten fore and aft.

I-58 use of Kaiten prior to and after sinking USS Indianapolis:

"Regarding the Kaiten carried by I-58 during the patrol, which resulted in the loss of the USS Indianapolis, the following details emerge. I-58 departed Kure on July 16, 1945 and immediately returned to repair Kaiten periscopes. On July 18, Hashimoto once again departed for his station east of the Philippines. 

At 1400 hours, on July 28, I-58 sighted what Hashimoto identified as a tanker and destroyer escort. He launched two Kaiten at this time and claimed two hits. In fact, the cargo ship Wild Hunter, and destroyer Lowry were the targets. Lowry sustained moderate damage from an explosion; the submarine was reported to authorities. Apparently, USS Indianapolis was not informed of this incident (she had departed Guam several hours prior to the attack) although Captain McVay was informed of IJN submarine activity in the area east of the Philippines. After the sinking of USS Indianapolis, Hashimoto proceeded to patrol for targets between Okinawa and Leyte. On the morning of August 10 Hashimoto launched a Kaiten against destroyer escort Johnnie Hutchins and a second against four of her sisters. He escaped upon the surface and claimed to have sunk two destroyers. 

In what would prove to be Hashimoto's last Kaiten launch during the war the USS Oak Hill -- a landing ship, dock -- and destroyer escort Thomas F. Nickel were sighted late in the afternoon of August 12, some 350 miles southeast of Okinawa. Identifying the vessels as a seaplane carrier and destroyer escort, Hashimoto launched his last operational Kaiten. At about 1830 hours Oak Hill sighted a periscope close aboard and maneuvered to evade. Nickel charged in to attack, heard the Kaiten scrape along her port side and watched the craft explode some 2,500 yards away. Hashimoto recorded the explosion and subsequent depth charging which the Nickel had commenced when Oak Hill reported a second periscope in the vicinity. Recording an apparent hit, Hashimoto returned to Japan immediately thereafter." 

My source is "Suicide Squads," by Richard O'Neill (published in 1981). [12]


Testimony of Mochitsura Hashimoto:

During his testimony, the US Navy questioned Hashimoto specifically:

Q.  What kind of torpedoes did you fire?

  • A.   (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) Type 95 torpedoes, propelled by oxygen.


Q. Why did you not use KAITENS?

  • A.   (As given by interpreter Commander Bromley) KAITENS weren’t used, first, because he was delayed in determining the type of target; secondly, because it was night; and thirdly, because torpedoes were considered to be sufficient. [11]


Not only does this testimony refute Dietrichs' claim as to the type of torpedo used by I-58 during the attack, but also proves that the subject of any use of Kaiten was indeed addressed during the trial of McVay.

the US Navy knew about the IJN's use of Kaiten both prior to and after the sinking of the USS Indianapolis.

In fact, the IJN Submarine I-53 had engaged a convoy protected by the USS Underhill ( DE-682) six days earlier on July 24, 1945, using a number of Kaiten.  


USS Underhill (DE-682)

"Arguably the most successful attack by Kaiten was that on USS Underhill commenced on 24 July 1945. She was a unit of the numerous Buckley class destroyer escort and at the time of sinking was escorting several supply and troop ships. Subsequent to being spotted by a Japanese naval reconnaissance plane; submarine I-53 attached to the Tamon group and carrying six Kaiten was redirected to the expected location of the convoy."

USS Underhill after realizing this noticed several sonar contacts, which were later revealed to be a Japanese submarine and several Kaiten. A depth charge run was made which did not succeed in killing the submarine although it is suspected that it did succeed in neutralizing one of the Kaiten. The depth charge run was followed by a ramming attempt on a submarine at periscope depth.

As the Underhill rammed the surfaced vessel (later revealed to be a Kaiten) it was struck by a second Kaiten waiting in ambush. Both pilots detonated their charges, one of which led to the detonation of the destroyer's boilers, which led to her being torn in half by the explosions. The sinking resulted in the loss of almost half of her complement, including most of the officers." [7]


 The reality is far less dramatic than Dietrich claims:


"A far more common outcome of Kaiten attacks was the Japanese submarine transporting them being sunk before it got within range of its target, usually with a tremendous loss of life.

Over 100 Kaiten pilots died during training or during attacks. Over 800 more Japanese sailors were killed transporting them to their targets. Meanwhile, US estimates for losses due to Kaiten attacks put the death toll at less than 200 men. Ultimately, the Kaiten managed to sink just two large ships: the Mississinewa, and a destroyer the USS Underhill." 

The Kaiten were born out of this desperation and the wishful thinking that fanatic self-sacrifice could make up for Japan’s military weakness compared to the Allies. Lieutenant Hiroshi Kuroki and Lieutenant Sekio Nishina of the Japanese Navy designed and tested the first prototypes, which were essentially nothing but human-guided torpedos. The Kaiten never really evolved in practice to be anything else.

The only significant modifications were the introduction of controls and basic air filtration systems, along with an upgraded 3, 420 lb warhead. Over 300 of these Type 1 Kaiten were eventually built. Though the Japanese continued modifying the design of the Kaiten until the end of the war, the Type 1 was the only version to actually see use.

Needless to say, the Type 1 was a dangerous craft to pilot. Water frequently leaked into the pilot’s compartment and the engine, which often caused the craft to explode prematurely. Early designs allowed the pilot to open the Kaiten in an emergency, but the escape hatch was eventually phased out because the pilots refused to use it. Once a pilot was in a Kaiten, they knew that they weren’t coming out again". [10]


A Kaiten Type 1 being launched



A  detailed history of the I-58 reveals that there were  possibly two Kaiten actually aboard the I-58 at the time it attacked the USS Indianapolis which were not used in the attack:

In IJN Submarine I-58: Tabular Record of Movement, Bob Hackett records: 

27 July 1945:
LtCdr Hashimoto takes up position on the Guam-Leyte route and moves westward.

28 July 1945:
The Philippine Sea, 300 miles N of Palau. At0530, I-58 is forced down by a radar-equipped airplane. After 1400 Hashimoto sights a large tanker, escorted by a single destroyer. At 1431, kaiten No. 2, piloted by FPO1C Komori Kazuyuki is launched against the tanker, followed Lt(jg) Ban Shuji's No. 1, targeting the destroyer, at 1443.

I-58's target is the 6,214-ton armed cargo ship WILD HUNTER (ex-EXPOUNDER), en route to Manila. At 1620 (local) WILD HUNTER's lookouts sight a periscope at 10-25N, 131-45E. Twenty-eight minutes later another periscope is spotted. The cargo ship engages the attacker with his 3-inch gun, maneuvering radically to present a smaller target. After several shots the periscope disappears.

Aboard I-58, two explosions are heard at 1520 and 1530, but a rain squall prevents Hashimoto to verify the results of his attack. After surfacing his radar detects no targets in the vicinity. He later reports both ships as sunk. I-58 heads SE, to the intersection of the Leyte-Guam and Palau-Okinawa routes.

That same day, INDIANAPOLIS arrives at nearby Guam. Since she is not equipped with sonar or hydrophones, McVay requests a destroyer escort. His request is denied. McVay's orders give him discretion as to whether or not to zigzag while under way. INDIANAPOLIS begins the trip from Guam to Leyte unescorted; the first major warship to do so during the war without equipment to detect enemy submarines.


29 July 1945:
Philippine Sea, 250 miles N of Palau. At sunset, the INDIANAPOLIS is zigzagging at 17 knots in overcast weather. Captain McVay orders zigzagging ceased because of poor visibility. At 2305, following a radar check, I-58 surfaces. She is heading south when her navigation officer Lt Tanaka Hirokoto (72) spots a ship approaching from the east, 90-degrees off the port beam at 11,000 yards. LtCdr Hashimoto identifies the target as an IDAHO-class battleship. The target is making 12 knots and not zigzagging.

Hashimoto dives and prepares to attack with conventional torpedoes. He also alerts FPO1C Shiraki Ichiro to man No. 6 kaiten, with No. 5 (FPO1C Nakai Akira, both bow kaiten) as reserve, but he doubts the pilots can find the target in the dark with their short (2.9-m) Type 97 periscopes.

When the distance is down to 4,400 yards, Hashimoto realizes that INDIANAPOLIS will pass by so close that his torpedoes will not have time to arm. He orders right rudder and begins a long circle to increase the range.

At 2326 (JST), Hashimoto changes the torpedo data computer set up to a 60-degree port angle on the bow. At a range of 1,640 yards, he fires a spread of six Type 95 Model 2 torpedoes with 2-second intervals, all set to the depth of 4 meters. He observes three equally spaced hits on the starboard side. The first is forward of the No. 1 turret, the second is abreast of the same turret, followed by an explosion and bright red flame. The third is near the bridge, abreast the No. 2 turret. Hashimoto sees that his target is stopped, is listing to starboard and down by the bow. He decides another attack is necessary and dives to 100 feet to open the range, reloading his two forward torpedo tubes. [3]

30 July 1945:
At 0027, INDIANAPOLIS capsizes and sinks by the bow at 12-02N, 134-48E. Thirty minutes after his last observation, Hashimoto raises his periscope, but his target is gone. After surfacing a new check reveals no further traces of his victim. I-58 departs the area at full speed, heading north while recharging its batteries. [4]

At 0300, Hashimoto reports to the Sixth Fleet HQ that he sank an "IDAHO-class battleship."


3 December 1945:
As details of the INDIANAPOLIS disaster begin to become public - arguably the worst in American naval history - Fleet Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations convinces SecNav James Forrestal that they need a scapegoat. King brushes aside Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz's recommendation that Captain McVay be given only a letter of reprimand. Instead, he ensures that formal charges are brought against McVay.

Although 700 navy ships are lost in combat in WWII, McVay is the only captain that is court-martialed. He is tried for "hazarding his ship by failing to zigzag during conditions of good visibility" and "culpable insufficiency in the performance of duty" for failure to order Abandon Ship in a timely manner.

Cdr Hashimoto testifies at McVay's trail. He states that zigzagging would have made no difference. Four-time Navy Cross winner Cdr (later Vice Admiral) Glynn R. Donaho (former CO of FLYING FISH and PICUDA) also testifies that zigzagging would have been ineffective. King's court ignores both Hashimoto's and Donaho's testimonies and finds McVay guilty.

After Nimitz succeeds King as Chief of Naval Operations, he presses Secretary Forrestal to remit McVay's sentence in its entirety. Forrestal agrees. This releases McVay from arrest and restores him to duty, but he is never given another command at sea.

1 April 1946: 
Operation "ROAD'S END:"
I-58 is stripped of all usable equipment and material and towed from Sasebo to an area off Goto Retto by the submarine tender USS NEREUS (AS-17). She is blown up with C-2 demolition charges at 32-37N, 129-17E. The first I-58 (now designated I-158) is scuttled during the same operation.

The Fate of IJN Submarine I-58:


I have found no evidence that would substantiate Dietrich's claim that US Intelligence considered Japanese Kamikaze to be of "occult origin".


Sources:

1. Dietrich, Douglas: (audio) Coast to Coast AM, May 30, 2011." The Sinking of USS Indianapolis"  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJmVo2Ts8Js&list=PL04ciitCq3nDH-j4xWBMI8apSVuumm4Nk&index=2

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Indianapolis_(CA-35)

3. Warfare History Network: "World War II Fact: Japanese Sunk the Ship That Carried the Atomic Bomb", June 26, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/world-war-ii-fact-japan-sunk-ship-carried-atomic-bomb-163514

4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_submarine_I-58_(1943)

5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mochitsura_Hashimoto

6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaiten

7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaiten#Sinking_of_USS_Underhill

8. https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Japanese_submarine_I-58

9. https://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=IJN-I58

10. https://allthatsinteresting.com/kaiten

11. Testimony of Commander Mochitsura Hashimoto at Court Martial of Captain Charles B. McVay, III Thursday, 13 December 1945, Washington Navy Yard 

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/loss-of-uss-indianapolis-ca-35/investigation-and-court-martial/court-martial.html

12. Williamson, Mitch: "Kaiten Carried by Japanese Submarine I-58" (2015)

https://forlornhopesui.blogspot.com/2015/05/kaiten-carried-by-japanese-submarine-i.html

13. Jones, Stack: Hell is Highwater - "The True Story Of The WWII Cruiser The USS Indianapolis" (2018).

https://stackshortstories.wordpress.com/2018/01/01/hell-highwater/

14. Vincent, Lynn: "Terror at Sea: The Tragic Sinking of the USS Indianapolis" ( 2018)

https://www.historynet.com/deep-sinking-uss-indianapolis.htm

15. WW2 "Ultra"  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultra#Japanese

16. Hackett and Kingsepp: "IJN Submarine I-58: Tabular Record of Movement"  (2017) http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-58.htm

17. Vincent L and Vladic, S.: "Indianapolis: The True Story of the Worst Sea Disaster in US Naval History" (July 2020) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM7l5PUSZ4w







Sunday, March 7, 2021

Refuting Douglas Dietrich: Marcus Island Japanese Defenses - Part Three

 

Remains of Japanese Defenses on Marcus Island

"The Island was an impregnable fortress, impervious to bombing damage with reinforced concrete bunkers... an underground fortress, laced with tunnels connecting to secret facilities... All of the people and technology was underground....in a mountain larger than the Island itself." - Douglas Dietrich



Note: Marcus Island defenses also included a number of 6-inch Naval guns and Type 95 (Ha-Go) Light Tanks. [5]


A number of these tanks were dug into permanent concrete positions or placed individually at points around the Island. 

The Type 41 6-inch (150 mm) gun fired a 100-pound (45.4 kg) shell with either an armor-piercinghigh explosive, or general-purpose warhead. An anti-submarine shell of 113-pound (51.3 kg) was developed and in service from 1943. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_6-inch_naval_gun#Japanese_naval_service

Type 41 6-inch (150 mm) gun 

Type 95 Tank in concreted position

An intricate series of trenches connected to pillboxes, rifle pits, and blockhouses surrounded the entire shore of the Island with concreted defensive positions on all three corners.

Most numerous, however, were the anti-aircraft positions.  I have designated the "Heavy" anti-aircraft guns in red (above) as shown on US Navy maps.  There were also a similar number of "light" anti-aircraft positions scattered at various points around the Island.

25mm Light Anti-aircraft gun



Type-3 5- inch (12 cm) Heavy AA gun 


I have shown the heaviest concrete defenses in grey (above).

I have reviewed almost a dozen US Navy maps from 1942-45.  Both the targeting and battle damage assessment maps of the Island in 1942-43 indicate very specifically that these were above ground.

In fact, the maps showed detailed locations of concrete personnel barracks, administrative buildings, earth-covered buildings, fuel, oil, and ammunition storage sites, bomb shelters, aircraft hangars,  radio transmission sites, radar sites, and several large concrete "bunkers" used for dry storage (some of which were not targeted).

May 19-20, 1944
(USN) Third Raid on Marcus - Planes from a three-carrier task force under the command of Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery hit Marcus with a predawn fighter sweep and strafed and bombed the island for two consecutive days.

Anyone who pays close attention to the photographs taken of the Island during and shortly after the war will notice that by 1945 the Island was devoid of any vegetation and very few structures above ground remained.  The runways had been destroyed with no attempt to rebuild.

There is no evidence whatsoever to substantiate the claim that the Japanese had created any subsurface structures into or under the Island itself.  Were it not for a continued effort to re-supply the garrison on Marcus Island, it is quite possible they would have starved to death.  The conditions encountered by US Occupation Forces on the Island in  August 1945 were desperate, with the majority suffering from severe malnutrition and disease. 

According to a March 10, 1946, Owensboro, Messenger (KY)  article titled: "Marcus Island, Old Jap Outpost, Was Heavily Fortified Against Invasion"

"It was used as a weather and radio station and a base for staging aircraft to other Japanese possessions in the Central Pacific."

"...Over 500 Japanese had been killed by bombs and another 500 had died of starvation, and the gaunt survivors were eating weeds, birds, and a few squash pumpkins which they had managed to grow in gardens.  Only one tree remained standing."

"Navy Captain A.E. Loomis, the Islands Commander, said that when US forces occupied Marcus, they found about 6o Japanese trucks and a dozen tanks still intact. They were quickly turned into junk by a series of races staged by Marines and Seabees.  The wrecked equipment was then bulldozed into a long wide trench and buried."

To say that there were no civilians on the island during WW2 is also untrue.  Although a smaller number remained in August 1945 at the time of the Japanese surrender, there had been hundreds of Japanese civilian laborers on the Island throughout the war. 

Unlike the many other Pacific Islands invaded by the US in WW2, Minami-Tori-shima posed no significant threat, in fact, it was decided to simply bypass and isolate the remote Island and suppress its sustainability with a continued bombing effort.

A very similar situation existed involving Wake Island.  

"The surrender of Marcus found 1763 Army and 779 Navy personnel remaining-the majority ill and emaciated-even though 300 moderately sick cases had been permitted to depart two days previously in a demilitarized Japanese APD which had been allowed to bring in food for the starvation-threatened garrison and instructed to remove as many of the sick as could be returned to Japan. 

There were also 204 civilians on Marcus, including 15 Koreans. Because of inadequate facilities for their reception and treatment, the Japanese APD had not attempted to remove the worst hospital cases, but had, instead, left them for future evacuation by a hospital ship." [5]

"In 1947 the high tide caused by a typhoon washed away a large section of the (Southwest portion of) the island. For this reason, the U.S. Army that was stationed there withdrew from the island, and Marcus Island became once again an uninhabited place." [3]


April 30 to May 6, 1952 – Report by Mr. Sakagami of the Zoological Institute, Faculty of Science, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. He made the following comments in his report on Marcus Island, published in 1961 by Pacific Science:

Now being totally disfigured, Marcus Island, which lies peacefully and beautifully with a green cover and white beach surrounded by deep-colored semitropical ocean, impressed us as a disappointment as soon as we landed on it. Everywhere on the island are to be found residues of war. All along the coast are trenches, with tochkas here and there on which rusted anti-aircraft guns are still pointing to the sky. On the northern coast, from the eastern end to the western, a broad runway was constructed for occasional visits of airplanes, and almost all the southwesterly one-third of the island is gone as it was devastated by the typhoon, the ruins of United States camps and trucks scattered everywhere."  [5]




Type 95 Tank


Type 95 Tanks for inspection at surrender August 1945


Remains of Type 95 Tank


Remains of Naval gun


Remains of Naval gun


Remains of concreted defensive position

Remains of concreted defensive positions


Remains of concreted defensive positions

Concrete dry storage bunker west side (left center)

Concrete dry storage bunker 

South end pier from above

South end pier from above

Southern end pier USCGC Kukui Annual Re-supply 1966-67

USN Tanker delivering annual fuel supply 1966-67

Southern end pier

Remains of Southern end pier

Japanese cemetery (1895)



Concrete defensive position southern end.



Pillbox facing lagoon to the east

Sources:

1. https://www.mejstanley.com/gallery-traces-of-a-tempest-passed/

2. https://loran-history.info/stations/marcus/ladd_photos/ladd_photos.html

3. https://en.vill.ogasawara.tokyo.jp/minamitorishima/minamitori_history/

4. https://loran-history.info/stations/marcus/brooks_1966-67_photos/brooks_1966-67_photos.html

5. https://pacificairlifter.com/places-i-have-been/the-marcus-island-run/a-history-of-marcus-island-part-3-post-world-war-ii/

6. https://pacificairlifter.com/places-i-have-been/the-marcus-island-run/marcus-island-during-ww2/2944-2/



Saturday, March 6, 2021

Refuting Douglas Dietrich: "Marcus (Monster) Island was an impregnable underground fortress - Japan's Area 51"

Marcus Island: Part Two

"Everything I just said I learned from Douglas" -Peter Moon

Douglas Dietrich and his side-kick Peter Moon (Vincent Barbarick) not only claim that Marcus Island was a "primary objective of the Doolittle Raid in June 1942", but they also claim that the Island was "an impregnable fortress, impervious to bombing damage with reinforced concrete bunkers."

They said the island was actually an underground fortress, laced with tunnels connecting to secret facilities. "All of the people and technology was underground....in a mountain larger than the Island itself."

That the boat channel on the western side of the Island was actually an undersea tunnel entrance where "submarines went into and under the Island." 

"Douglas had pointed out to me something that I consider to be the most enigmatic and overlooked historical aspect of World war Two. The super dirigibles at Roswell are just part of a bigger unit which was a place called Minami-Tori-Shima."  

"It's called Monster Island because of the onsite development of non-conventional weapons with onsite maximum threat protection potential as a testbed for revolutionary technology including secret aircraft. It has a reputation for being Japans Area 51"  -Peter Moon 

1:10:00 - !:21:00  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otHmI2CSxZ4&t=4475s


What Dietrich and Moon have related has no basis in fact and should be considered total fiction. The actual history of Marcus Island during World War 2 reveals a significantly different reality. 

At the height of the war, over 4,000 Japanese soldiers were stationed on the island. Defended by a trench system and beach defenses around the perimeter of the island plus light and heavy anti-aircraft batteries. 

Between March 1942 until July 1945 Marcus Island was attacked by American carrier aircraft and bombers and was bypassed, leaving the garrison isolated and cut off from resupply, aside from submarine or rescue. 

https://pacificwrecks.com/provinces/japan_marcus.html

May 1943: The Japanese strength on Marcus Island was strengthened further and the South Seas Garrison Unit (about 600 men under a LtCol) was added to its defenses. On 1 May 1943, Captain Matsubara was promoted to Rear Admiral. He reported to Chichijima special base force (reorganized from 7th base force). In 1943 the Minami Torishima Fortress garrison consisting of approximately 1,100 Navy, 2,250 Army, and 650 civilian personnel, for a total of approximately 4000 personnel.

9 August 1943: The submarine USS SUNFISH (SS-281) commanded by Lt. Cdr. Richard W. Peterson arrives submerged about 12 miles off the beach and conducts a two-day reconnaissance of the island. Several aircraft were noted in the area and a ship was anchored on the south side of the island. They were able to identify the ship as a TATUHUKU MARU-type freighter (1951 tons). It was swinging radically at anchor, indicating strong and variable currents close in from the southeast. Occasional heavy rain squalls obscured the island from the Sunfish. They were able to get within 3000 yards of the ship but the currents would not allow a good shot. At times, a full right rudder was needed in the maneuvering. A 500-ton trawler was also noted, patrolling the south side of the island. Finally, the captain decided it was not worth another day and the fuel to attempt to close on the target and they departed the area at 1500 on 10 August 1943."

https://pacificairlifter.com/places-i-have-been/the-marcus-island-run/marcus-island-during-ww2/


USS Sunfish - SS-281 (US Navy photo)

Douglas Dietrich claims that the US Navy conducted four "special recon missions/raids" by submarines on Marcus Island before September 1943, which involved the insertion of frogmen who he said "discovered dirigibles, secret aircraft, a death-ray machine, and micro-wave testing devices".  

"Each of these reconnaissance raids brought back more alarming news of developments to the Americans". After which the Navy considered Marcus Island "the most formidable vanguard of offense or defense involving weapons of war for Japan." 

I have found no record of any such "reconnaissance raids" made by Navy submarines.

The only record of any surveillance by a submarine is that of the USS Sunfish, which did so during a long-range patrol.

The reconnaissance by USS Sunfish did not involve any Navy UDT Team.  The sea conditions it reported were heavy rains and squalls which obscured the island and currents so heavy the Sunfish decided to withdraw. This and a distance of over 3,000 yards would have made the insertion and recovery of a UDT Team too dangerous a risk.

In Dietrich's fictional version, "the frogmen found these materials and sent an armada of ships to Marcus Island...the largest ever deployed" and the Island was then referred to as "Monster Island" by the US Navy.

"US High Command referred to is as Monster Island because of the onsite development of non-conventional weapons with maximum threat protection potential as a testbed for revolutionary technology including secret aircraft."

Second Raid on Marcus Island August 31- September 1, 1943.

Dietrich describes the armada of ships but does not bother to name them. Only that they "were intending to obliterate 'Monster Island' and failed."

"At Marcus, 80 percent of the enemy’s installations were destroyed." [1]

Contrary to what Dietrich claims, the objectives of the Second Marcus Island Raid were not to simply "obliterate the Island."  In fact, it was intended to destroy as many targets as possible.  It was also the first use of the latest coordinated tactics and procedures to be used by a combined carrier strike force and the first use of the Grumman F6F Hellcat in combat.


Looking south at Marcus Island under attack on September 1,1943
 (USN photo)

The "armada" Dietrich failed to identify was actually Task Force 15 (TF-15).

31 August- 1 September 1943: A second US Navy carrier attack was conducted for two days, August 31-September 1, 1943. Three carriers were involved in this attack, the USS Essex (CV 9), the USS Yorktown (CV 10), and the USS Independence (CVL22). And the new F6F Grumman Hellcat made its debut combat mission.

Task Force Fifteen rendezvoused north of Hawaii on the morning of August 23, 1943. Three carriers, the Yorktown, Essex, and Independence, formed the nucleus of the task force, referred to as Task Force 15.5 under the command of Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall. Accompanying the carriers were the cruisers CL-43 USS Nashville and CL-63 USS Mobile, and the battleship BB-58 USS Indiana. 

Task Group 15.1 was under the command of Captain Herman A. Spanagel. Ten destroyers, under Captain Thompson, were included in the Task Force.

Outcome:

80% of the installations on Marcus Island were destroyed as well as 7 G4M "Betty" medium bombers on the ground.

A third raid on Marcus Island occurred in May 1944.

May 19-20, 1944
(USN) Third Raid on Marcus - Planes from a three-carrier task force under the command of Rear Admiral A. E. Montgomery hit Marcus with a predawn fighter sweep and strafed and bombed the island for two consecutive days.

From May 1944- August 1945 there were nearly 90 smaller bombing attacks on Marcus Island, the vast majority made by B-24 heavy bombers.

August 31, 1945
(USN, USA) The Japanese garrison at Marcus officially surrenders to American General Whiting.


Surrender of Japan, Marcus Islands, Mariana Islands, August 31, 1945.
"On a table decorated with samurai swords and the surrender document, Japanese officers surrender Marcus Island to the U.S. Navy onboard USS Bagley (DD-386), anchored off the island. In the center is Rear Admiral Masata MATSUBARA, commander of the island’s garrison, flanked by an Imperial Army Colonel at his right (Col Junzo SEO) and Lt Cmdr Torahiko NAKAMURA, the Deputy Island Commander, at his left. The surrender was accepted by Rear Admiral F.E.M. Whiting. (Photograph released September 2, 1945. Official U.S. Navy photograph, now in the collection of the National Archives.)

After the time of the surrender, there were 2,542 Japanese Army and Navy personnel, plus a number of Japanese civilians remaining on the island. the majority of them were suffering from all forms of tropical maladies and most of them suffered from severe malnutrition. Not only were they unfit as laborers, but their continued presence on the island also presented a threat to the health of the Occupation forces." 

https://pacificairlifter.com/places-i-have-been/the-marcus-island-run/marcus-island-during-ww2/

Surely the American forces occupying and inspecting the Island after its surrender would have discovered any "secret technology" or the so-called tunnel systems connected to an underground base. 

None of the target maps before the attack or the battle damage assessments made following, show the existence of heavily reinforced concrete bunker structures suspected to be hidden underground, none were discovered following the Japanese surrender in August 1945.

According to this source, the Japanese commander on Marcus may have been killed by one of his own officers.

Of interest: 

The questionable death of Col. Yoshiichi Sakata.

"The commander of the Japanese Army forces on Marcus Island was Col Sakata. Col. Sakata died on Marcus and is listed as a battle casualty. The real story is a little different and there are two versions of what happened:

The first version states that one of his officers developed “island fever” and demanded that Sakata abandon the island. This officer was certainly delusional; Sakata would never have returned his command to Japan even had it been in his power to do so. When Sakata rebuffed the man’s demands, the officer killed Sakata. What became of the officer is unknown. He was probably given a field courts-martial on the island and executed. I imagine it would have been too difficult to send him back to Japan for trial at that point in the war. It’s surprising that more of the personnel on Marcus didn’t go nuts. Marcus was short of everything except personnel.

The second version, suggested by Akira Takizawa: Because of the serious shortage of food, Admiral Matsubara advised Col. Sakata that the army forces would return to Japan. But, Col. Sakata did not agree with it, because his pride did not allow him to retreat from the front. Admiral Matsubara asked Captain Nakamura, the tank unit commander, to persuade Sakata. Nakamura persuaded Sakata, again and again. But, Sakata did not agree. At last, Nakamura killed Sakata and then committed suicide."

Source:  https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=209730#p1892949

Target map prior to raid - 1943


Target Map prior to raid 1943


BDA Following Raid 1943


TBF-pilots studying map of Marcus Island before September 1 raid.

TFB Avenger Torpedo Bomber off Marcus Island during raid


Looking southwest at Marcus Island under attack by the Navy on August 31, 1943